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ABSTRACT 
I empirically examine the effects of bankruptcy protection (Chapter 11) on airfares in the 
U.S. domestic airline industry using cross sectional air tickets data from 2001:Q1 through 
2012:Q4. A hedonic price model was developed to identify the determinants of airfares. The 
results indicate that, airfares charged by a bankrupt airline are approximately 4% lower than 
airfares of other airlines that are not in bankruptcy, ceteris paribus. Individually, bankrupt 
airlines lower their airfares as much as 16-19% during bankruptcy protection. Furthermore, it is 
evident that low cost carriers (LCCs) have significantly lower airfares than legacy carriers. This 
confirms the high degree of price competition in the industry.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The airline industry, one of the industries to breakout from tight economic regulation in 
1978, has been facing increased intra-industry competition in the decades following 
deregulation. Since the passage of the U.S. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, carriers became 
free to enter or exit any domestic markets, and were given more freedom to price their services. 
The deregulation was intended to introduce more competition in the industry.  
Over the past three decades, while the U.S. airline industry’s output and productivity 
have grown tremendously, its financial performance has been dismal, leading to over 25 
bankruptcy filings (GAO, 2014). According to Borenstein (2011), since deregulation the airline 
industry had lost $60 billion (2009 dollars) in domestic markets, and the industry has reported 
negative net income in 23 of 31 years post 1978. The lackluster financial performance can be 
explained by a number of reasons, such as high fuel costs, entry and expansion of low cost 
carriers (LCC’s) and severe demand shocks as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attack (Borenstein, 
2011).  
Financial distress has been proven to have a significant effect on the pricing behavior of 
airlines as well as bankruptcy filings (Hofer et al., 2009). Carriers can slash costs drastically 
during Chapter 11 reorganization, allowing them to renegotiate contracts and reduce debts, and 
giving them an edge over other financially stronger competitors in the industry. Thus, financially 
distressed carriers are more likely to lower airfares (Barla and Koo, 1998; Hofer et al., 2009).  
When it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2011, American Airlines reported that 
“several air carriers have reorganized in recent years under Chapter 11, including United, Delta, 
and US Airways. These cost reduction efforts, bankruptcy reorganizations and subsequent 
consolidations (e.g., United/Continental; Delta/Northwest) have allowed carriers to decrease 
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operating costs. Lower cost structures have generally resulted in fare reductions. Over the past 
several years, the Company [American Airlines] has been unable to offset its substantial cost 
disadvantage through increases in passenger traffic, changes in the mix of traffic that improve 
yields and/or cost reductions. Consequently, the Company filed the Chapter 11 Cases to become 
a more efficient, financially stronger and more competitive airline” (AMR Corporation, 2012, 
page 3). However, Borenstein and Rose (1995) suggest that airfares are not affected when 
airlines file for Chapter 11, although they might slash airfares prior to filing for bankruptcy.  
 In this thesis, I analyze how airfares in general are impacted by carrier’s bankruptcy in 
the U.S. domestic airline industry as well as how bankrupt airlines adjust their airfares at the time 
of bankruptcy. I collect tickets data from the DB1B and T-100 databases maintained by the 
United States Department of Transportation (U.S.D.O.T.) and airline financial data from the 
Airline Data Project of the MIT Global Airline Industry Program. My sample contains over 24 
million observations on passenger air tickets of eleven major U.S. domestic airlines which 
include, Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, United Airlines, US Airways, America West 
Airlines, Continental Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Jet Blue 
Airlines and Southwest Airlines, representing network carriers, regional carriers and LCCs 
respectively. Seven bankruptcy filings during the period 2001-2012 will be taken into 
consideration in this study. 
 The results indicate that, airfares charged by bankrupt airlines are approximately 4% 
lower than airfares of other airlines that are not in bankruptcy, ceteris paribus. Additionally 
when examining individual bankrupt airlines, my results show that US Airways and Hawaiian 
Airlines reduced their airfares by approximately 16 to19 percent during bankruptcy. These are 
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the largest fare reductions seen among fares charged by bankrupt airlines. Northwest Airlines 
was the only exception’ the company increased airfares at the time of bankruptcy.  
 The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 contains a thorough background 
review about the impact of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, financial and economic 
performance of the airline industry, bankruptcy in the industry, collective agreements, and finally 
the concept of strategic bankruptcy filings; Chapter 3 contains a detailed discussion on the data 
used for the study; in Chapter 4, I conduct a regression analysis to determine the effect of 
bankruptcy on airfares; Chapter 5 presents the results of the analysis; Section 6 contains the 
conclusions.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
The U.S. airline industry was tightly regulated between 1938 and 1978. The Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) was in charge of overseeing both economic and safety matters in the 
industry until the late 1950s, when its authority over aviation safety was transferred to the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Under the CAB regime, price and entry regulations in 
the airline industry were deliberately designed to promote the financial stability of airlines. By 
removing regulatory control from the CAB, the expectation was that the markets would operate 
more efficiently and carriers could offer a wider range of service options through competition 
(Goetz and Vowles, 2009). 
According to Brock (2009), the CAB had four key powers with regard to the airline 
industry: (1) the power to grant or deny the certificates of public convenience and necessity; (2) 
the power to approve or reject the fares charged by carriers; (3) the power to approve or deny 
airline mergers; (4) the power to approve or disapprove collusive agreements among carriers. 
The United States Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 is a dramatic event in the history of 
economic policy which enabled the U.S. airline industry to be one of the first few sectors to 
breakout from tight regulation. The Act was intended to introduce more competition in the 
airline industry, and steer it away from monopoly and oligopoly. The deregulation was expected 
to attract new airlines to enter the market and increase competition, which in turn would benefit 
consumers by reducing airfares and improving service quality. Since the passage of the Act, 
carriers are free to enter or exit any domestic markets, and given more freedom to enter and serve 
any domestic market they preferred and to price their services. The deregulation made free entry 
possible by 1980 and free pricing by 1983, while abolishing the CAB by 1985 (GAO, 2006).  
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Following the deregulation, the airline industry experienced five major changes. (1) Fare 
structure was very important for airlines. In light of the abolition of price regulation, firms had to 
come up with innovative pricing strategies (such as frequent-flyer programs) to keep up with 
increased competition. (2) Route structure had to be redesigned from the point-to-point route 
system to the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system due to the fact that the later proved to be cost effective. (3) 
Fleet composition became a major determinant of cost since firms only wanted to bear minimum 
costs possible to slash airfare, whereas before deregulation ‘size and comfort’ of the plane were 
the more important factors. (4) Labor costs had to be cut substantially to reduce airfares and 
airlines were able to compete aggressively in the industry. This even tempted some firms to file 
for bankruptcy in order to renegotiate with labor unions. (5) Traditional air ticket distribution 
patterns such as going through travel agents have been replaced since the customers embraced 
the internet distribution which has provided them with cheaper, flexible airfares and routing 
options (Harteveldt, 2012). Furthermore, these channels have supported airlines to exhibit their 
unique features in order to attract more customers and build loyalty (Kole and Lehn, 1999).  
As Morrison and Winston (1990) explained, air carriers that were “fit, willing and able” 
could serve any route and charge fares up to any level which they considered appropriate. They 
argued, however, that the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry produced mixed results. More 
people are flying than ever before due to the reduced airfares and more routing options. However 
the U.S. airline industry has also experienced earning volatility (Vasigh et al., 2008). This 
volatility has resulted in many airline bankruptcies, labor layoffs, employee pay cuts, reduction 
of shareholder wealth, and immense uncertainty in the market. The financial returns are 
considered inherently volatile especially due to key demand and cost characteristics that make it 
impossible for airlines to reduce capacity in periods of declining demand at a rush. For example, 
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airlines have high fixed costs and are unable to adjust either flight schedules or labor costs when 
demand for air travel declines, mainly due to commitments to and collective bargaining 
agreements with other parties. Prior to deregulation, the financial performance of airline industry 
was stable with minimal losses and satisfactory profits. However, this was due to the government 
regulation which prevented competition in the industry (Vasigh et al., 2008). 
2.1.1. Market Structure and Competition 
According to Brock (2009), the basic elements of the market structure in the airline 
industry are: (1) the nature of demand, (2) the relative size and concentration of carriers, (3) the 
proliferation of alliances and cooperative agreements, and (4) the barriers to effective 
competition. 
The consumer demand for air travel has minimal substitutes with regard to its speed, and 
consumer demand is sensitive to changes in the cost of air travel, income and trip flexibility. The 
degree of price sensitivity (demand elasticity) varies by a number of factors (Smith and Pearce, 
2008). For example, airlines face two groups of travelers in general. Leisure travelers are more 
sensitive towards price changes but have more flexibility in terms of travel time, compared to 
business travelers who are less sensitive to price changes and are less flexible. In order to extract 
maximum profit possible, airlines practice price discrimination.  
Prior to 1978, the market had a limited amount of airlines, and air travel routes were 
regulated. Inefficient carriers were protected from competition since the CAB controlled prices 
and entry. After the Deregulation Act there was substantial entry of new competitors; as a result, 
the airline industry moved closer towards increased competition. Airfares declined, productivity 
boomed, and airline services expanded. However, this process gradually turned into a different 
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path with many of the new entrants merging with major carriers or filing for bankruptcy and 
exiting the industry (Liu and Lynk, 1999). 
Kim and Singal (1993) write that the surviving carriers were handed a substantial amount 
of market power, which led to price increases in some situations. They argue that the tendency of 
moving back towards less competition has raised questions about the long-run structure of airline 
markets. 
Relative size and concentration of carriers is another important factor in the market 
structure. The U.S. passenger airline industry is primarily composed of network carriers, LCCs 
and regional airlines. Network carriers functioned even before the 1978 deregulation act, and 
they carry out complex hub-and-spoke operations at a wide variety of domestic and international 
destinations, with thousands of employees and hundreds of aircrafts. Since 40% of network 
airlines’ revenue depends on international service, domestic service is often aligned with their 
international networks (GAO, 2014).1  According to the United States Department of 
Transportation (U.S.D.O.T., 2014), out of approximately 120 certified air passenger carriers 
which operated within the U.S., 78% of them were legacy carriers, and the rest were LCCs and 
regional carriers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Most of the major U.S. passenger airlines have been using the hub-and-spoke system since the year 2001. Hubs are 
special nodes that are part of a network, located in strategic locations to facilitate connectivity between airports, and 
spokes are the routes that planes take out of the hub airport (O’Kelly, 1998). The main purpose of the hub-and-spoke 
system is to manage cost effectiveness of airlines and to provide passengers with better routes to destinations. For 
example, Delta Air Lines has hubs in many cities including Atlanta, Detroit, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York-
LaGuardia, New York-JFK, Salt Lake City, and Seattle (http://news.delta.com/Stats-Facts). 
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Table 2.1. Airline Domestic Market Shares October 2013 - September 2014  
(Market share based on revenue passenger miles). 
Airline Share  
Delta 16.7% 
Southwest 16.6% 
United 15.3% 
American  12.5% 
US airways 8.4% 
Jet Blue 5.1% 
Alaska 4.2% 
Express Jet 2.4% 
Sky West 2.3% 
Sprint 2.1% 
Other 14.4% 
Source: U.S.D.O.T. (2014)  
According to Table 2.1, Delta Air Lines and Southwest Airlines have captured the most 
market share out of all the domestic airlines in the U.S. By the end of 2014, the top five airlines 
were able to capture 70% of the domestic market share and the rest was distributed over 100 air 
carriers.  
LCCs entered the market after deregulation and operated less costly point-to-point 
service using fewer types of aircrafts. For example, Southwest Airlines uses the traditional point-
to-point system, hauling people short distances with few or no connecting flights. Southwest has 
been very successful in capturing the domestic market share despite the heavy competition in the 
industry.  Furthermore, Southwest Airlines has grown in to being the world’s largest LCC within 
a short span of time. LCCs, such as Allegiant Air and Spirit Airlines are referred to as ultra-low-
cost carriers because they provide service often to leisure destinations at discount fares, but 
charge higher optional fees, such as carry-on and checked baggage charges. As Hüschelrath and 
Müller (2011) conclude, LCCs should be considered as the driving force of competition in the 
domestic U.S. airline industry. Despite the advantages which the legacy airlines may have, such 
as the size of network and the quality of services, LCCs have competed well enough by 
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introducing themselves to medium and long haul markets and by selecting legacy dominant 
routes and thereby creating a close substitute to the legacy carriers (Hüschelrath and Müller, 
2011). 
Regional airlines operate much smaller aircrafts, turboprops or regional jets with up to 
100 seats, and generally provide their services to communities whose willingness to pay is  lower 
compared to network carrier customers. Some regional airlines are owned by network airlines, 
while others are independent. Approximately 22% of all airline passengers in the U.S. market are 
served by regional carriers (GAO, 2014). 
Large network operators have operating agreements with smaller regional airlines. For 
example, Delta has operating agreements with Sky West, Chautauqua Airlines, Shuttle America, 
and Freedom Airlines for feeder services. Others like United-Continental and US Airways have 
entered in to cooperative scheduling, ticketing and marketing partnerships. Also, there are 
instances where these airlines have formed strategic alliances with leading foreign airlines 
(Brock, 2009). 
Legacy airlines established prior to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 were 
significantly impacted by the emergence of LCCs. Legacy carriers were considered to provide 
higher quality service when compared to the LCCs (GAO, 2014). 
Following the deregulation in the early 1980s, the industry was able to raise the load 
factors with peak load pricing strategies, and it was able to set airfares that closely reflect the 
cost of service. Some airlines were tempted to exercise the price setting power in concentrated 
markets, but the entries of the LCCs cast a negative effect on airfares indicating the fact that the 
industry was increasingly becoming more competitive (Graham, Kaplan and Sibley, 1983). 
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Although deregulation introduced more competition, industry competition has never been 
rising steadily and consistently at all times. New airlines entered the industry between 1978 and 
1983, these included People Express, New York Air, Midway, Muse, and former interstate and 
charter airlines. These new carriers created direct competition to the 10 major airlines at that time 
(United, American, Delta, Eastern, TWA, Western, Pan Am, Continental, Braniff, and 
Northwest). As a result, the combined market share of the major carriers declined from 87% to 
75% (Goetz and Sutton, 1997). However, by the mid-80s a fair amount of mergers, acquisitions 
and bankruptcies occurred, and consolidation and firms’ exits reduced competition. In the late 
1980s the combined market share of the nine largest airlines, which included American, United, 
Delta, Northwest, Continental, US Air, TWA, Pan Am, and Eastern, added up to 92 % of 
domestic revenue passenger miles (Williams, 1993). The industry sustainability was very 
unpredictable at this time period.  From 1992 to 1996, the industry observed another wave of 
new airlines, which included ValuJet/AirTran, Spirit, Kiwi, Vanguard, Midway, Frontier, Reno, 
and Western Pacific (Goetz, 2002).   
To keep up with increased competition, airlines had to come up with innovative strategies 
to meet the increased consumer demand. Some of the strategies include, the adoption of 
computerized reservation systems, loyalty marketing schemes such as frequent-flyer programs, 
travel agent commission overrides, and corporate discounts (Borenstein, 1992; Goetz, 2002). 
2.1.2. Service Quality 
Prior to deregulation, customers paid a premium price and received high service quality 
in return. Air carriers were financially capable of providing high quality service due to the lack 
of competition in the industry. After the deregulation, consumers searched for lower airfares, and 
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airlines resorted to cost-cutting and lowering service quality to provide low airfares (Chang and 
Yeh, 2002). 
Lower service quality in the industry was exacerbated by the entering of LCCs, which 
basically offered a lower quality product to a niche market where the consumers were searching 
for lower airfares. This appeared to be a very successful approach as the LCCs have been able to 
capture about 40% of the industry market. Legacy carriers were the most affected because most 
of their costs were fixed and large. They were not able to reduce their service quality to match 
LCCs’ prices. As a result, they had to consider other options to compete in the industry 
(Borenstein, 2011). 
Although the CAB established minimum service standards prior to 1978, after 
deregulation, market forces signaled information on price, routes, and service levels. There are 
two general methods used by the industry to measure the airline service quality: (1) the consumer 
survey research and (2) secondary data from the Airline Quality Rating Report (ATCR). At 
present, especially with the wide spread of digital technologies and social media, consumers 
have the opportunity to punish those airlines that fail to provide the expected and necessary 
service quality levels (Waguespack and Rhoades, 2014). 
2.1.3. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)  
Despite a large number of new entrants in the airline industry following the deregulation 
which resulted in increased competition, many of the firms were short lived (Goetz and 
Dempsey, 1989). The reason is that legacy airlines were able to run most of them out of business 
initially. At the same time, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) occurred with the intention to 
eliminate competition for specific routes and hubs, or to expand geographical coverage. These 
airline mergers are a product of deregulation, and they had a significant effect on the industry. 
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Merging has been used as a strategy by airlines to remain competitive or to prevent bankruptcy 
(Shaw and Ivy, 1994). 
Airlines seek to merge with or acquire other air carriers with the intention of increasing 
profitability and financial sustainability, although in most instances they have to weigh potential 
benefits of M&A against increased operational costs, regulatory costs, and operational 
challenges. Airlines expect to reduce costs through combining complementary assets, eliminating 
duplicate activities, and reducing capacity. In addition to seeking the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s (U.S.D.O.J.) approval, and managing increased operational costs of integrating 
workforces, aircraft fleets and systems must also be considered by airlines to make M&A a 
success. As part of its analysis, the U.S.D.O.J. uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 2 to 
assess if a merger is likely to significantly increase concentration and raise anti-competitive 
concerns in the markets in which the airlines operate (GAO, 2008). 
Two M&A waves were noted in the airline history. First wave of U.S. airline mergers 
was in the 1980s and it was introduced by Borenstein (1990) from his paper on “Airline mergers, 
airport dominance, and market power”. The second wave of U.S. airline mergers was in the late 
1990s (Bilotkach et al., 2013). According to Fan et al. (2001), there are few forces which 
influence the structure of airline alliance and consolidation: (1) increased globalization in trade 
and air transportation, (2) increased intra-regional interaction, (3) economic incentives for airline 
consolidation, (4) pace of liberalization in air transport industry, and (5) anti-trust concerns. They 
also state that the airline industry at that time period was facing the second wave of 
consolidation. 
                                                          
2 This is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. The U.S.D.O.J considers a market with a result of 
less than 1,000 to be a competitive marketplace, a result of 1,000-1,800 to be a moderately concentrated 
marketplace; and a result of 1,800 or greater to be a highly concentrated marketplace. Generally, mergers that 
increase the HHI by more than 100 points in concentrated markets raise antitrust concerns (U.S.D.O.J., 2014) 
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Airline consolidation emerged since the 1980s and has gradually increased through the 
years. According to the U.S.D.O.T (2014) , the U.S. airline industry has been restructured with a 
notable number of mergers which involve the top industry airlines in the past decades. The first 
wave included 8 M&A among major airlines in the industry between 1985 and 1988. Two of 
these mergers, Northwest-Republic and TWA-Ozark, were highly criticized by the U.S.D.O.J 
because the merging airlines shared the same primary hub3, which later resulted in increasing 
airfares in the dominant, primary airports (Borenstein,1992). The rest of the M&A included 
Delta-Western, American-Air California, US Air-Piedmont, and US Air-Pacific Southwest 
airlines. However, these M&A only created minor positive effects on the airfare according to 
Morrison and Winston (1990). 
In 2005, 11 airlines including American, Delta, United, Continental, Northwest, 
Southwest, US Airways, America West, Alaska, Jet Blue, and AirTran captured 96% of the 
domestic market, whereas by 2014 the number of airlines dominating the market was reduced to 
6 (Delta, Southwest, United, American, US Airways and JetBlue). The following mergers 
occurred in the 2000s. American merged with US Airways in 2013; AirTran merged with 
Southwest in 2011; United merged with Continental in 2010; Northwest merged with Delta in 
2009, and US Airways merged with America West in 2005. 
According to the Airport Council International (ACI, 2013), airline M&A are lengthy and 
complicated processes, which include a complex flight integration involving other affiliates. 
Although M&A allow airlines to enter new markets and strengthen existing market destinations, 
not all newly acquired destinations will be profitable. For example, United acquired 36 new 
                                                          
3 Northwest and Republic airlines shared the same primary hub which is Minneapolis. After the Merger in 1986, it is 
said to have created airport dominance which resulted in prices rising 23% faster than the national average 
(Borenstein, 1990). 
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international markets but cut 22 existing destinations in favor of utilizing resources for entries 
into destinations with higher demand. Southwest’s acquisition of AirTran led to cuts in services 
to several cities. 
As a result of this consolidation, about 85% of passengers in the U.S. flew on four 
domestic airlines in 2013. Certain industry observers have raised concerns that consolidation 
could have adverse effects on airline competition, such as higher airfares and reduced service. 
Others argue that consumers stand to benefit from recent changes in the industry as profitable 
airlines reinvest in new planes and expand their networks (GAO, 2013). 
Table 2.2. Airline Mergers and Acquisitions from 1978-2014  
Title Announced Closed Resulting Entity 
Pan Am / National Airlines  1/7/1980 Pan Am 
North Central Airlines / Southern Airways / 
Hughes Airwest 
 7/1/1979 Republic Airlines 
Republic Airlines / Hughes Airwest  10/1/1980 Republic Airlines 
Continental Airlines / Texas Air 
Corporation 
 10/31/1982 Continental Airlines 
Southwest Airlines / Muse Airlines 6/25/1985 12/12/1985 Southwest Airlines 
Northwest Airlines / Republic Airlines 1/23/1986 10/1/1986 Northwest Airlines 
TWA / Ozark Air Lines 3/1/1986 10/27/1986 TWA 
Delta Air Lines / Western Airlines 9/9/1986 12/16/1986 Delta Air Lines 
Continental Airlines / People Express / New 
York Air / Frontier Airlines 
 2/1/1987 Continental Airlines 
Alaska Airlines / Jet America  10/1/1987 Alaska Airlines 
American Airlines / AirCal 11/18/1986 4/30/1987 American Airlines 
US Air / Piedmont Airlines  8/4/1989 US Air 
American Airlines / Eastern Air Lines: 
Latin Routes 
 7/1/1990 American Airlines 
American Airlines / TWA: Heathrow 
Routes 
 5/2/1991 American Airlines 
Delta Air Lines / Pan Am Airlines (Shuttle 
and Atlantic Routes) 
7/27/1991 11/1/1991 Delta Shuttle 
United Airlines / Pan Am: Latin & 
Caribbean Routes 
12/9/1991 5/16/1992 United Airlines 
Southwest Airlines / Morris Airlines 12/13/1993 12/31/1993 Southwest Airlines 
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Table 2.2. Airline Mergers and Acquisitions from 1978-2014 (continued) 
Title Announced Closed Resulting Entity 
AirTran Airways / Valujet 7/11/1997 11/17/1997 AirTran Airways 
Delta Air Lines / Atlantic Southeast 
Airlines 
2/16/1999 3/22/1999 Delta Air Lines 
American Airlines / Reno Air 11/19/1998 2/1/1999 American Airlines 
American Airlines / TWA 1/10/2001 4/9/2001 American Airlines 
Republic Airways / Shuttle America 4/22/2005 5/9/2005 Republic Airways 
US Airways / America West Airlines 5/19/2005 9/27/2005 US Airways 
Republic Airways / Midwest Airlines 6/23/2009 7/31/2009 Republic Airways 
Republic Airways / Frontier Airlines 8/14/2009 10/1/2009 Republic Airways 
Delta Air Lines / Northwest Airlines 4/14/2008 12/31/2009 Delta Air Lines 
United Airlines / Continental Airlines 5/3/2010 10/1/2010 United Airlines 
Southwest Airlines / AirTran Airways 9/27/2010 5/2/2011 Southwest Airlines 
SkyWest / Atlantic Southeast Airlines 8/15/2005 9/8/2005 SkyWest / ASA 
SkyWest / Atlantic Southeast Airlines / 
ExpressJet Airlines 
8/4/2010 11/15/2010 SkyWest / SureJet 
Delta Air Lines / Comair 10/18/1999 10/22/1999 Delta Air Lines 
Alaska Airlines / Horizon Air 11/19/1986 12/31/1986 Alaska Airlines / 
Horizon Air 
US Air / Pacific Southwest Airlines  5/29/1987 US Air 
Alaska Airlines / Alaska Coastal Airlines  4/1/1968 Alaska Airlines 
Pinnacle Airlines / Colgan Air 1/18/2007 1/18/2007 Pinnacle Airlines / 
Colgan Air 
Pinnacle Airlines / Mesaba Airlines 7/1/2010 7/1/2010 Pinnacle Airlines / 
Mesaba Airlines 
US Airways/AMR/American Airlines 2/14/2013 12/9/2013 American Airlines 
(AAL) 
Southwest Airlines / ATA Airlines 11/19/2008  Southwest Airlines 
US Airways/AMR/American Airlines 2/14/2013 12/9/2013 American Airlines 
(AAL) 
Source: UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database 
 Table 2.2 displays the flow of the airline industry M&A, which followed straight after the 
deregulation in 1978. It clearly shows the two U.S. merger waves in the airline industry which 
were the late 1980s and the period after 2000 which was laid out by Borenstein (1990) and Fan et 
al., (2001). Although there were a high number of new entrants to the airline industry especially 
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after the deregulation process, it is clearly seen by the number of increasing M&A that it must be 
challenging for the airlines to survive with the heavy competition and highly volatile input costs 
(GAO, 2013). 
 2.1.4. Labor   
The pre-deregulation era was quite a favorable time period for the labor unions in the 
U.S. airline industry. Seventeen out of nineteen major airlines in the U.S. had unionized labor, 
and unionization was considered very powerful. The unions had the capability of shutting down 
major carriers at any point if their demands were not met (Thornicroft, 1989). Since most of the 
jobs related to the airline industry were unique, it was almost impossible to find replacements 
during a strike. Thus, keeping up air service demand during a strike was difficult if not 
impossible for an airline carrier (GAO, 2006).  
Airline labor relations were covered by the Railway Labor Act of 1936. Airline unions’ 
bargaining structure was highly decentralized and also separated by crafts such as pilots, 
mechanics, etc. Prior to deregulation, labor unions and airline management had to negotiate in 
carrier-by-carrier bargaining, which followed pattern bargaining.4 During this time frame, labor 
relations within airlines were healthy since airlines were allowed to pass on the increased labor 
costs to the airfare through the CAB’s fare-setting. Another important element which prevailed 
was the Mutual Aid Pact,5 a strike insurance plan created in 1958 to increase the bargaining 
power of airlines. This too was eliminated with the deregulation, giving more power to labor 
unions in contract renegotiations (GAO, 2006). 
                                                          
4 The last contract signed by one carrier served as the starting point for the next airline. 
5 Strike-struck airlines were compensated by non-struck airlines based on increases in traffic the latter received 
during a strike (GAO, 2006). 
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After the deregulation, there was an increase in the labor costs mainly due to the 
developments of hubs and the increasing number of airline carriers (Kahn, 1988). Bankruptcies, 
poor financial performance, and corporate restructuring during the deregulation era put a lot of 
attention on labor cost management. With increased competition airlines tried to reduce airfares 
through reducing labor costs (Borenstein and Rose, 1994). Pay cuts became quite normal in this 
industry, and they varied between 4% and 18% at times. Additionally, it was difficult to bargain 
directly with the powerful unions, and one option the carriers had may have been filing for 
bankruptcy, which indirectly gave them the opportunity to renegotiate the labor wages (Bamber 
et al., 2009). 
Pay gap between the unionized labor and non-unionized labor showed a significant 
disparity in earnings. Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) explain that unionized labor had high 
bargaining power since airlines’ earnings depended highly upon employees’ skills and service 
quality. 
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Figure 2.1. Average Labor Wages of Major Airlines in U.S 
Source: MIT Global Airline Industry Program 
When considering the labor wage distribution of the major U.S. airlines in Figure 2.1, it 
is shown that the carriers have reduced the labor wages drastically, just after filing for 
bankruptcy protection. Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings of Delta Air Lines (2005), Frontier Airlines 
(2008), Hawaiian Airlines (2003), United Airlines (2002), and US Airways (2002 and 2004) 
have all resulted in substantial labor cost reductions. Only American Airlines deviated from this 
by being able to gradually increase the labor costs after filing for bankruptcy in 2011. 
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Figure 2.2. American Airlines Average Labor wages 
 
Figure 2.2 clearly displays how American Airlines average labor wages have gradually 
increased even though it filed for bankruptcy protection in 2011, making it the only airline which 
did not respond to bankruptcy through its labor wages.  
In Figure 2.3, United Airlines displays a drastic drop in labor wages after it filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
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Figure 2.3. United Airlines Average Labor Wages 
 
2.2. Financial and Economic Performances in the Airline Industry 
The structure–conduct–performance paradigm explains that the market environment has a 
direct, short term impact on the market structure, and the market structure has an influence over 
the firm’s economic conduct which in turn affects the market performance of the firm itself. The 
market performance may or may not affect the market structure or the economic conduct. 
However, Liu and Lynk (2010) suggest that in the post-deregulation era (between 1984 and 
1991), airlines actively tried to influence the market structure. For example, Liu and Lynk (2010) 
find that airlines were able to enhance market dominance through gains in economies of scope 
and economies of density; aviation technology enabled economies of network size, and predatory 
pricing became possible through scheduling and frequent-flyer programs. 
Some of the major practices in the industry include reduction of operating costs, 
increased load factors, increased availability of discounted tickets, and increased number of 
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flights without decline in services to comparatively smaller communities (AMR Corporation, 
2012). 
These practices enable the creation of the hub-and-spoke method of delivery, complex 
pricing methods, dominance of many airports by a single carrier, emergence of computer 
reservation systems, and customer loyalty programs such as frequent flyer programs and travel 
agent commissions (Borenstein, 1992). 
After deregulation, while some consumers may still have to travel on a few airlines the 
consumers in general now have a larger choice of airlines on a particular route. Under the hub 
and spoke system, it is possible to decrease operating costs for airlines by increasing load factors 
on route segments, allowing the air carriers to expand their scope of operation and also 
increasing the number of city pair routes, with less direct flights between cities (Evans and 
Kessides, 1993).  
2.2.1. Airfares 
Prior to deregulation, all airfares and routes were determined by the CAB and price 
increase requests took a longer time period to be processed and generally were not approved. 
Additionally, when the CAB was in control, airlines had to operate under fixed prices for 
specific routes regardless of operating costs (Belobaba et al., 2009). Since deregulation, stringent 
routes and fare regulations were eliminated, and airlines began to engage in price competition, 
and they had to compete with many LCCs (Kole and Lehn, 1999). Borenstein and Rose (1994) 
concluded that price dispersion in the airline industry is larger in a competitive market than in a 
monopoly; this suggests that firms price-discriminate more in a competitive setting. 
Consumers benefited from reduced airfares with deregulation. According to Gaynor and 
Trapani (1994), the greatest gains to consumers were in the long-haul markets where real price 
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reductions were the greatest. Therefore, when comparing the airfares in 1978 and 2006, a clear 
price drop around 40% can be observed (Smyth and Pearce, 2006). Borenstein (1991, 1992), and 
Graham et al., (1983) show that airfares do respond to the level of competition in the market as a 
direct result of the deregulation. 
LCCs which normally operate in point-to-point networks tend to reduce airfare through 
cost saving strategies such as not providing meals, no advanced seat selections, and by not 
providing any airport lounges. They offer a restricted product but have been successful in 
gaining market power due to very low airfares which the legacy airlines have not been able to 
compete with due to high operational costs (Tsikriktsis, 2007). 
2.2.2. Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination is a common strategy used in the airline industry. The airline sells 
the same product at different prices. Arthur C. Pigou (1920) made a distinction between different 
levels of price discrimination6 in his book “The Economics of Welfare”. The main principle 
behind price discrimination is that a firm tries to exploit different price elasticities of demand to 
extract maximum profits. When consumers have an inelastic demand the firm can set higher 
prices for these consumers. Whereas customers who are more sensitive to prices (or have more 
elastic demand) will respond more drastically to a price cut or a price increase. The firm can 
                                                          
6According to Carlton and Perloff (2005), first-degree price discrimination is a situation in which the seller charges a 
different price for each unit of good or service, such that the price of each unit is equal to the consumers’ willingness 
to pay. First-degree price discrimination is commonly known as personalized pricing. Second-degree price 
discrimination refers to a situation in which each consumer faces the same non-linear pricing schedule whereby 
different prices are charged for different amounts of the good purchased. Prices are lower with increased quantity 
purchased. Sellers could also vary prices according to the quality of the product consumers buy. Second-degree 
price discrimination is thus known as menu pricing. Third-degree price discrimination refers to the case in which 
different consumers are grouped or separated based on observable characteristics that enable the seller to charge the 
same price within same group but different prices across groups, but each consumer pays a constant price for each 
unit of the good bought. Third-degree price discrimination is also known as group pricing. 
 
  
23 
 
benefit if it can separate these consumers and therefore reduce their consumer surplus 
(Borenstein and Rose, 1994). 
Second degree and third degree price discriminations are very common in the airline 
industry. Under second degree price discrimination, the airline charges different prices to 
different customers or at different times depending on the quality of service chosen by the 
consumer as well as the quantity of purchase. Second degree price discrimination relies on a self-
selection mechanism by which the airline offers a price schedule and lets customers select from a 
menu of product categories. The product’s attributes may differ by quality, time, convenience, 
flexibility and quantity (Stavins, 2001). The consumers’ choice of product reflects their 
willingness to pay. The frequent-flyer program is another example of second degree price 
discrimination, where the consumers are rewarded for large purchases, and they receive a special 
kind of quantity discount (Steen and Sørgard, 2002). Airlines also offer business-class, first-
class, and economy or coach class seats to travelers with varying degrees of willingness to pay. 
The menu of choices is a sorting mechanism that allows travelers to self-select the product 
category that best reflects their willingness to pay. For example, business travelers with low 
demand elasticities for air travel choose business-class and pay a full fare, but leisure or 
discretionary travelers with high demand elasticities choose economy or coach class and pay a 
discounted fare (Borenstein and Rose, 1994). 
Third degree price discrimination involves charging different prices to different groups of 
customers. Airlines must be able to directly observe and identify the different groups of 
customers, and members within each group are charged the same price that maximizes the firm’s 
profit in the group, but prices vary across groups. The most common way of segmentation for 
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this type of price discrimination is by geographical location. Other common forms of such price 
discrimination include discounts such as those for students or senior citizens (Borenstein, 1985). 
2.2.3. Airfares Since 2008 
The airline industry and the U.S. economy as a whole was severely affected by the recent 
recession in 2008. Demand for air travel has been recovering ever since, leading to higher 
airfares despite the low jet fuel prices. Consumers have been paying approximately 4% more on 
airfares on average in 2014 compared to 2007. 
As per the U.S.D.O.T. (2014), the average one-way, inflation-adjusted domestic airfare in 
U.S. was $366 in 2007 and it increased to $381 in 2014. According to Figure 2.4, airfare follows 
the same path of the drastic drop of the GDP growth rate in year 2008 resulting in lower airfares 
for the consumers. Since then the airfare has been gradually increasing with minimal fluctuations 
up until 2014.  
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Figure 2.4. Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers: Airfare vs. GDP Growth Rate 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Economic Data  
 
GAO (2014) gives two reasons for the notable average airfare hike between 2007 and 
2012. First, network airlines reduced domestic capacity in 2007 due to unfavorable economic 
conditions. The reduced capacity affected the industry in 2009 when the economy began to 
recover because the ASM did not bounce back immediately despite the increased demand in air 
travel. Second, although the LCCs had the reputation of offering lower airfares than network 
airlines, GAO (2014) suggested that it is no longer true and that recent trends also showed that 
the fare-reducing effect of the LCCs is declining. Another study conducted at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) found that Southwest Airlines, a major LCC airline in the U.S., no 
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longer has the price disciplining effect that it once had. As a result, airfares soared after 2008 
(GAO, 2014). 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 display airlines’ passenger revenue per available seat mile (PRASM) 
and the passenger yield, respectively. PRASM is calculated by dividing passenger revenue by 
available seat miles. PRASM is a measure of passenger “unit revenue” that gives an indication of 
how much revenue the airline is making for each unit of output produced. This measure is 
equivalent to the product of load factor and passenger yield (MIT Global Airline Industry 
program, n.d.). In other words, it is a measure of average airfare per seat mile. 
Passenger yield is calculated by dividing passenger revenue by revenue passenger miles 
(RPMs). Thus, it is a measure of average airfare paid per mile per passenger. It is an indicator for 
assessing changes in airfares over time. Since passenger yield varies by stage length and does not 
account for load factor, yield comparisons across airline or markets are less useful. Nevertheless, 
both PRASM and passenger yield are two important metrics for output price performance in the 
airline industry (MIT Global Airline Industry program, n.d.). 
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Figure 2.5. Passenger Revenue per Available Seat Mile 
Source: MIT Global Airline Industry Program 
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Figure 2.6. System Passenger Yield in the Airline Industry 
Source: MIT Global Airline Industry Program 
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 According to Figure 2.5, the average PRASM in the airline industry varies between 8 and 
12 cents per available seat mile. Airlines including Southwest, American and Delta display 
above average PRASM figures by the end of 2013, while Frontier displayed the lowest figures. 
When I consider the bankruptcy filings for the major airlines in comparison with Figure 2.5, 
American Airlines’ PRASM continued to rise after its bankruptcy filing in 2011. US Airways 
had its lowest PRASM figures at the time of both of its bankruptcies in 2002 and 2004. But soon 
after emerging from bankruptcy in 2005 it was able to increase the PRASM figures considerably. 
United Airlines too showed its lowest PRASM figures during the bankruptcy in 2002, but it 
managed to increase its PRASM gradually throughout the years when it was under bankruptcy 
protection. After filing for Chapter 11 in 2005, Delta Air Lines seems to have increased its 
PRASM figures at an accelerating rate when compared to the non-bankrupt years. However 
Frontier Airline remains the only company which lowered its PRASM just after filing for 
bankruptcy protection. 
 Figure 2.6 shows that the average passenger yield in the U.S. airline industry varied 
between 10 and 15 cents per RPM from the mid-1990s to 2013. By the end of 2013, only 
Southwest Airlines and American Airlines were able to increase their passenger yields above 15 
cents per RPM, whereas Frontier Airlines displayed the lowest passenger yield of approximately 
11 cents per RPM among the major U.S. airlines in Figure 2.6.  American Airlines maintains its 
increasing passenger yield before and after the bankruptcy filing. Delta and United, which show 
a decreasing trend of passenger yield prior to the bankruptcy filing, managed to gradually 
increase their passenger yield throughout the bankruptcy protection period. US Airways shows 
no significant difference in its passenger yield in its two bankruptcy filings even though it 
experienced a drastic increase and drop in its passenger yield figures in years 2006-2007.  
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 I am able to see from Figures 2.5 and 2.6 that in 2008, almost all the airlines have lower 
PRASM and passenger yield. This was the time period when the U.S. was facing an economic 
recession. The airline industry was severely affected by the recession however, by the end of 
2013 I can see that the industry’s performance matrices improved substantially. 
2.3. Bankruptcies in the Airline Industry 
The greatest fear expressed by critics of airline deregulation was that bankruptcies and 
mergers would lead to rapid industry concentration, which in turn would lead to higher air fares 
(Anderson et al., 2005). 
Many airlines declared bankruptcy after the deregulation in 1978. Some airlines have 
either ceased operations completely (Chapter 7) or opted for major restructuring under the 
bankruptcy protection of Chapter 11. The time under bankruptcy may vary from firm to firm 
depending on how much financial or economic distress the firm might be facing. Generally, if a 
firm under the bankruptcy protection tries to prolong its stay, legal fees may accumulate, and 
also in the worst scenario, creditors might be given permission to take control of the airline either 
to operate or to liquidate (Barla and Koo, 1999). 
  National Florida and Evergreen International Airlines ceased their operations completely 
by filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the years 1990 and 2013, respectively. On the other hand, 
many major U.S. airlines including US Airways, Delta, Frontier, American, and United have 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the past two decades, suggesting that the industry’s 
financial performance is unstable.   
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Table 2.3. Major Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filings in U.S. Airline Industry 
 Airline Chapter Date Filed 
for 
bankruptcy 
Date 
Emerging 
from 
bankruptcy 
Date Refiling 
for 
bankruptcy 
1)  Air Florida System Inc. 11 7/3/1984 9/15/1984 5/25/1988 
2)  America West Airlines 
Inc. 
11 6/27/1991 8/10/1994  
3)  AMR Corporation 11 11/29/2011 12/08/2013  
4)  ATA Holdings Corp. 11 10/26/2004 1/31/2006 4/2/2008 
5)  Atlas Air Worldwide 
Holdings Inc. 
11 1/30/2004 7/14/2004  
6)  Braniff Inc. (1989) 11 9/28/1989   
7)  Braniff International 
Corp. (1982) 
11 5/13/1982 9/1/1983  
8)  Continental Airlines 
Corp. (1983) 
11 9/24/1983 9/2/1986 12/3/1990 
9)  Continental Airlines, Inc. 
(1990) 
11 12/3/1990 4/16/1993  
10)  Delta Air Lines, Inc. 11 9/14/2005 4/25/2007  
11)  Eastern Airlines Inc. 11 3/9/1989 12/22/1994  
12)  Fine Air Services Corp. 11 9/27/2000 5/8/2002 1/28/2004 
13)  FLYi, Inc. 11 11/7/2005   
14)  Frontier Airlines 
Holdings, Inc. 
11 4/10/2008 10/01/2009  
15)  Frontier Holdings Inc. 
(1986) 
11 8/28/1986   
16)  Global Aviation Holdings 
Inc. (2012) 
11 2/5/2012 12/10/2012 11/12/2013 
17)  Global Aviation Holdings 
Inc. (2013) 
11 11/12/2013   
18)  Hawaiian Airlines Inc. 11 3/21/2003 5/18/2005  
19)  Kitty Hawk, Inc. 11 5/1/2000 8/5/2002 10/15/2007 
20)  Mesa Air Group, Inc. 11 1/5/2010 1/20/2011  
21)  Midway Airlines Corp 
(2001) 
11 8/13/2001   
22)  Midway Airlines Inc. 
(1991) 
11 3/25/1991   
23)  Northwest Airlines 
Corporation 
11 9/14/2005 5/18/2007  
  
32 
 
Table 2.3. Major Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filings in U.S. Airline Industry (continued) 
 Airline Chapter Date Filed 
for 
bankruptcy 
Date 
Emerging 
from 
bankruptcy 
Date Refiling 
for 
bankruptcy 
24)  Pan Am Corp. 11 1/8/1991   
25)  Pinnacle Airlines Corp. 11 4/1/2012 4/17/2013  
26)  Tower Air, Inc. 11 2/29/2000   
27)  Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. (1992) 
11 1/31/1992 8/11/1993 6/30/1995 
28)  Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. (1995) 
11 6/30/1995 8/4/1995 1/10/2001 
29)  Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. (2001) 
11 1/10/2001   
30)  UAL Corporation 
(United) 
11 12/9/2002 1/20/2006  
31)  US Airways Group, Inc. 
(2002) 
11 8/11/2002 3/18/2003 9/12/2004 
32)  US Airways Group, Inc. 
(2004) 
11 9/12/2004 09/27/2005  
Source: UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database 
 Table 2.3 provides a list of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings by U.S. airlines. The table 
shows how common bankruptcies have been in the airline industry, as some of the major airlines 
have been filing for Chapter 11 protection more than once. With the entry barriers been taken off 
in 1978, price competition increased drastically, and the established legacy airlines failed to 
handle it especially with increased labor and unstable fuel costs. This led most of the major 
airlines to financial distress, and they were directed towards bankruptcy protection. Most airlines 
had no other alternative other than filing for Chapter 11 for restructuring (Hofer et al., 2009).  
There have been arguments that firms in financial distress have nothing to lose and would 
slash prices to generate cash. According to Borenstein and Rose (1995), there were many ways 
bankruptcy or financial distress might influence the pricing strategies of airlines.  
  
33 
 
(1) Filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy directly lowered the companies’ marginal costs 
due to re-negotiability and cost cutting. Additionally Chapter 11 filing adversely changed 
consumers’ perception of the company, because customers tended to perceive bankrupt 
airlines’ services as low quality and therefore expected to get lower airfares.  
(2) Airlines’ may discount more on future revenues as a result of bankruptcy. The 
higher the discount rate, the lower the present value of the future cash flows. In some 
instances they may reduce prices when increases in discount rates may lead to deviations 
from cooperative pricing behavior.  
(3) Bankrupt airlines may even alter their strategic position with the intention of 
becoming more aggressive in competition, whereas some bankrupt airlines might be risk 
averse and would be less aggressive in competition. 
(4) Predatory behavior from rivals was noticed during an airline’s bankruptcy. Some 
rivals made drastic price reductions to put the bankrupt airline completely out of 
business. 
The major finding in Borenstein and Rose (1995) was that airlines filing for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy had comparatively small fare reductions (5-6%) compared to fares prior to 
bankruptcy filing, but they did not further reduce airfares during the bankruptcy phase. 
Additionally, they found that airlines under bankruptcy protection experienced significant 
reductions in their route’s market shares, whereas their rivals were not affected by the actions of 
the bankruptcy protected firms and were able to maintain or even increase their airfares 
(Borenstein and Rose, 1995). 
Barla and Koo (1999) attempted to examine the effect of bankruptcy protection on an 
airline and rival’s pricing strategies, as well as the impact of bankruptcy on a firm’s average 
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operating costs. Their results contradicted those in Borenstein and Rose (1995); they found that a 
bankrupt airline is able to lower its operating costs through renegotiations and restructuring, 
whereby these low costs are used to lower the airfares after filing for bankruptcy. Besides Barla 
and Koo (1998), the results in Hofer et al. (2009) also contradicted those found by Borenstein 
and Rose (1995). Hofer et al. (2009) showed that financially distressed airlines tend to charge 
lower airfares. 
2.3.1. Recent Major Airline Bankruptcies 
On 29th November 2011, American Airlines filed for bankruptcy protection with $25.1 
billion in assets, making it the second largest airline bankruptcy since 1980 
(bankruptcydata.com, 2013). In the 2012 Form 10-K of American Airlines, the company 
mentions the following as reasons for bankruptcy filing: “We must compete with air carriers that 
have reorganized under the protection of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in recent years, 
including United, Delta and US Airways. It is possible that other significant competitors may 
seek to reorganize, or reorganize again, in or out of Chapter 11” (AMR Corporation, 2012, page 
1). The firm states that over the past several years, it “has been unable to offset its substantial 
cost disadvantage through increases in passenger traffic, changes in the mix of traffic that 
improve yields and/or cost reductions” (AMR Corporation, 2012, page 4). 
Delta Air Lines which accounted for 16.8% of the market share in the U.S domestic 
airline market in 2005 (U.S.D.O.T., 2006), filed for bankruptcy on 14th September 2005. Delta’s 
financial trouble was deepened further by skyrocketing costs of jet fuel that resulted from the 
aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Delta spent $1.35 billion more on fuel in 2005 
than it did in 2004; the increased fuel expenditure drained the company’s cash flow. Other major 
events and risk factors that struck the company included the terrorist attacks of 11th September 
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2001, cash-draining pension payments, low priced ticket fares, and intense competition from 
low-cost rivals such as AirTran and JetBlue (Delta Air Lines, 2005). 
Frontier Airlines, based in Denver, filed for bankruptcy protection after its main credit 
card processor held back substantial proceeds from Frontier’s ticket sales. In general, credit-card 
processors typically turn over revenues of ticket sales to airlines in a few business days. 
However, for financially weak airlines the processors can sign prior agreements to hold back a 
percentage of the revenue from the time a ticket is purchased until the passenger takes the flight. 
First Data Corporation was the credit card processor for Frontier Airlines; it withheld 100 % of 
the airline’s credit card transactions. This is a 55% increase from the previously withheld value. 
The withholding of funds led the company to seek bankruptcy protection (Frontier Airlines, 
2008). 
Changes in consumer behavior, especially the reduction in business travelers and changes 
in their travel patterns, contributed significantly in the reduction of United Airline revenues, 
which in turn severely impacted the company’s financial performance and its ability to meet its 
maturing debt obligations. United Airlines filed for bankruptcy on 9th December 2002, citing 
that Chapter 11 “offered the best available means to facilitate the implementation of necessary 
changes to the debtors' business to bring costs and operations in line with the current business 
environment” (United Airlines Inc, 2003, page 7). Furthermore, the firm stated that external 
events such as increased fuel prices, terrorist threats and increasing labor demands cause adverse 
economic impacts to the firm’s financial sustainability. 
US Airways had been hit twice by bankruptcy within a very short time frame. It first filed 
for bankruptcy protection on 8th November 2002. High operating costs comparing to LCCs, large 
number of lenders and financiers, inability of trustees to modify payment terms of public 
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equipment financings without the unanimous consent of holders of widely-held trust certificates 
and the company’s inability to reject surplus aircraft leases, return excess aircraft and extinguish 
applicable obligations without the bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11, were some of the 
important factors which contributed greatly towards the company filing for bankruptcy 
protection according to their annual report (US Airways Group, Inc., 2003). 
When US Airways emerged from bankruptcy in 2003, industry observers believed that it 
exited bankruptcy status in a rush. Nevertheless, according to the company’s 2004 annual report, 
the company claimed to have performed a thorough review of its operations to reduce costs 
significantly. It had also reduced its mainline capacity, realigned its network to maximize yield, 
initiated new business plans to utilize more regional jets, and expanded its strategic alliances 
with other carriers. These alterations, however, appeared to be unsuccessful, and the firm 
continued to incur substantial losses in its operations primarily due to the reduction in domestic 
revenue and significant increases in fuel prices. The firm attributed the drop in domestic market 
revenue as a result of the rapid growth of LCCs and the increased transparency of fares through 
internet sources. When the firm started to experience recurring losses, declining available cash 
and increased risk of defaults, it had to seek bankruptcy protection once again on 12th September 
2004 (US Airways Group, Inc., 2005). 
2.3.2. Predicting Airline Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy has reshaped the airline industry dramatically in the past decades. The risk of 
bankruptcy can be predicted using the Z-score model developed in 1968 by Edward I. Altman to 
measure several aspects of a company’s financial health to forecast the probability of the risk of 
going bankrupt. 
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Gritta (1982) called Edward Altman of NYU the true “father of financial bankruptcy 
forecasting,” because his Z-score model has been successful in predicting air carrier failures in 
early 1980s when it correctly presaged the bankruptcy filings of Braniff and Continental 
Airlines. Furthermore, the success rate of this model was over 70% (Gritta, 1982). 
The Z-score is composed of a few common business ratios, weighted by coefficients, 
which were obtained from previous bankruptcy filings. The Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968) is 
calculated as follows:  
Z-Score = 0.012𝑋1 + 0.014𝑋2 + 0.033 𝑋3+ 0.006𝑋4 + 0.999𝑋5, 
where, 
𝑋1=Working Capital/Total Assets, 
𝑋2= Retained Earnings/Total Assets, 
𝑋3= Earnings before Interest & Tax/Total Assets, 
𝑋4= Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities, 
𝑋5= Sales/Total Asset, and 
Z = Overall Index. 
Table 2.4 on the next page provides the definition of each variable. 
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Table 2.4. Variables of the Z-score (Altman, 1968) 
Variable Definition 
X1-Working Capital/Total 
Assets 
This ratio measures the net liquid assets of the firm relative 
to the total capitalization. Working capital is defined as the 
difference between current assets and current 
liabilities(Page 594) 
X2- Retained Earnings/Total 
Assets 
Retained earnings reports the total amount of reinvested 
earnings and/or losses of a firm over its entire life-Earned 
surplus (Page 595). 
X3- Earnings before Interest 
& Tax/Total Assets 
This ratio is a measure of the true productivity of the firm’s 
assets, independent of any tax or leverage factors (Page 
595). 
 X4- Market Value of 
Equity/Total Liabilities 
Equity is measured by the combined market value of all 
shares of stock, preferred and common, while liabilities 
include both current and long term. The measure shows how 
much the firm’s assets can decline in value before the 
liabilities exceed the assets and the firm becomes insolvent. 
This ratio adds a market value dimension which most other 
failure studies did not consider (Page 595). 
X5- Sales/Total Asset, The capital-turnover ratio is a standard financial ratio 
illustrating the sales generating ability of the firm’s assets. It 
is one measure of management’s capacity in dealing with 
competitive conditions (Page 595) 
Source: Altman (1968) 
The Z-scores yield key information on firm’s financial health. The Z-score ranges below 
are indications of whether a firm is in the “safe”, “grey” or “distress” zones. 
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Z-score > 2.99     “Safe” Zones. The company is considered safe based on the 
financial figures only.  
1.8 < Z < 2.99          “Grey” Zones. The chance of the company filing for bankruptcy 
within the next 2 years is high. 
Z below 1.80             “Distress” Zones. The score indicates a high probability of distress 
within this time period.  
Over the years many individuals have found that a more convenient specification of the 
model is of the form: Z = 1.2𝑋1 + 1.4𝑋2 + 3.3𝑋3 + 0.6𝑋4 + 1.0𝑋5. Using this formula, one uses 
the more commonly written percentages as coefficients in the model (Gritta, 1982). 
Table 2.5. Altman’s Z-scores in the U.S. Domestic Airline Industry 
Airline                                           Years (2005-2014) 
 
Dec 
2005 
Dec 
2006 
Dec 
2007 
Dec 
2008 
Dec 
2009 
Dec 
2010 
Dec 
2011 
Dec 
2012 
Dec 
2013 
Dec 
2014 
Alaska Airlines 1.34 1.3 1.24 0.91 1.24 1.63 1.78 1.97 2.58 2.59 
American Airlines 0.6 0.89 0.92 0.46 0.37 0.57 0.3 0.15 0.26 0.91 
Delta Air Lines 0.36 -1.18 0.91 -0.32 0.35 0.59 0.62 0.66 1.21 1.36 
Jetblue Airways 1.04 1.06 0.85 0.85 0.93 1.07 1.05 1.07 1.2 1.59 
Republic/Frontier 1.13 1.08 1.06 1.07 0.97 0.7 0.87 0.72 0.77 0.85 
Southwest Airlines 2.2 2.36 1.74 1.77 1.93 2.17 1.72 1.86 2.19 2.95 
United Continental -4.8 3.89 1.04 0.27 0.38 0.58 1.04 0.82 1.1 1.235 
US Airways 1.36 0.33 0.73 2.27 1.97 0.3 0.94 1.64 1.44 1.81 
Source: Gurufocus.com (http://www.gurufocus.com/tutorials.php#&id=zscore) 
 
Table 2.5 shows the Z-scores for the major air carriers in U.S. for the years 2005 to 
2014.All airlines in the table are U.S. passenger carriers classified as major carriers (or Class 1 
Carriers) under the U.S.D.O.T. classification ($1.0 billion of annual revenues). 
  
40 
 
It is noteworthy that all the 8 major airlines have Z-scores in the danger zone, which 
means that the probability of them filing for bankruptcy is very high. American, Delta, United, 
and US Airways had filed for bankruptcy protection, and US Airways filed more than once. 
There was only one instance when an airline (Delta) was in the safe zone for just one year.  
Southwest Airlines and Alaska Airlines were able to stand out from the others by 
maintaining and improving their Z-score values in the “grey zone” between 2005 and 2014. By 
the end of year 2014, both these airlines were at the margin of getting into the “safe zone”. 
The year 2014 can be considered a successful year for the airline industry because the 
major carriers were able to improve their Z-scores. This may be due to the huge drop in jet fuel 
prices in the world market, coupled with increased demand for air travel (IATA, 2014). 
2.4. Collective Agreements 
Collective bargaining agreements in the airline industry is a process of negotiations 
between airlines and employees or unions aimed at establishing agreements to regulate working 
conditions. Contract negotiations in the airline industry are governed by the Railway Labor Act 
(RLA), and these labor contracts never expire, but only have an amendable date which gives the 
opportunity for the firm and the labor unions to amend contracts if necessary (Nordenflycht and 
Kochan, 2003). 
Labor unions are a crucial player in the airline industry, where about 49.3% of workers 
are unionized, and 51.6% of the labor was under collective bargaining agreements in the airline 
industry by 2006 (Hirsch, 2007). 
  According to the GAO (2003), since the industry was deregulated in 1978, the average 
length of labor negotiations has increased, strikes have reduced, and non-strike work actions 
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have developed. The average length of time required to reach agreements on contracts between 
labor and airline management increased from 9 to 15 months after the 1990s.  
The employees in the airline industry had negative impacts due to airline strikes which 
include loss of income and laid off workers. Also disrupted flight scheduling and travel plans, 
loss of consumer loyalty, and increased expenses affected airlines who were in financial distress 
(IATA, 2014). 
2.5. Strategic Bankruptcy 
Barla and Koo (1999) discussed that bankruptcy protection is built to protect firms that 
are financially distressed to restructure and rebuild. The implications of bankruptcy protection 
are complicated. As a strategic move, financially stable firms may be tempted to gain subsequent 
advantages against the rivals by filing for Chapter 11. Bankruptcy may protect unfit firms to 
survive in a highly competitive environment.  
According to Barla and Koo (1999) Chapter 11 filing gives firms the opportunity to 
reduce costs, postpone repayments of capital and interests, and reject any contracts including the 
collective bargaining agreements.  As airlines under Chapter 11 bankruptcy are able to reduce 
costs in ways which non-bankrupt airlines are unable to, bankruptcy filing may allow carriers to 
slash airfares to increase the number of passengers, and the non-bankrupt rivals will have to 
reduce airfares to match the bankrupt carriers’ airfares (Barla and Koo, 1999). 
Delaney (1989) gives an anecdotal example of Continental Airlines which abrogated its 
labor contracts after filing for bankruptcy in 1983. Delaney (1989) calls this a “strategic 
bankruptcy” and argues that bankruptcy protection was used in this case to avoid the payment of 
liability awards, punitive damages or high labor costs. The opportunity for contracts re-
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negotiation can be considered as a major reason for filing for bankruptcy. Continental Airlines 
was able to successfully renegotiate its payments schedule on leased aircraft in 1990.  
In 1991, America West renegotiated leases with all of its hardware and software vendors; 
the renegotiation leases helped reduce the airline’s costs by 25 to 50%. Trans World Airlines was 
able to cut $660 million in wages as a result of renegotiations in 1995 (Barla and Koo, 1999). 
Ciliberto and Schenone (2012) further explain that an airline will unilaterally modify the 
labor agreements if the negotiations are unsuccessful and do not satisfy their needs. This gives 
more bargaining power to the airlines compared to the other parties involved. Another aspect is 
that the threat that an airline can be forced into liquidation, leaving employees jobless, becomes a 
reason for employees and labor unions to interact more willingly in the renegotiation process 
(Ciliberto and Schenone, 2012). Ciliberto and Schenone (2012) note that most bankrupt airlines 
use bankruptcy as a cost cutting strategy, which is otherwise illegal outside of court protection, 
especially to handle labor union contracts which are considered to be a heavy burden to the 
airline industry. 
However, Perotti and Spier (1993) conclude that an airline may also be in a good 
bargaining position to obtain concessions from suppliers or labor, even if it is not under Chapter 
11 protection. 
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3. DATA 
This study uses data on domestic, direct, coach-class airfares over the period 2001:Q1-
2012:Q4. The sample contains eleven major U.S. domestic airlines, which are classified as 
network carriers, LCCs and regional carriers.  Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, United 
Airlines, US Airways, America West Airlines, and Continental Airlines are network carriers 
(GAO, 2014); Hawaiian Airlines and Northwest Airlines are regional carriers (U.S.D.O.T, 
2014); Frontier Airlines, Jet Blue Airlines and Southwest Airlines are LCCs (GAO, 2014) in the 
U.S. domestic airline industry. Table 3.1 displays the amount of tickets issued by each airline in 
the sample.  
             Table 3.1. Sampled Tickets Issued by Operating Carriers  
Operating Carrier Freq. Percent Cum. 
American Airlines 2,391,345 10.24 12.87 
Jet Blue Airlines 520,756 2.23 14.90 
Continental Airlines 2,255,718 9.65 23.70 
Delta Air Lines 6,122,388 26.20 49.64 
Frontier Airlines  293,655 1.25 50.78 
Hawaiian Airlines  63,313 0.27 51.03 
America West Airlines  451,657 1.93 52.79 
Northwest Airlines 2,787,085 11.93 64.49 
United Airlines 1,607,464 6.88 71.77 
US Airways 1,521,028 6.51 78.51 
Southwest Airlines 5,349,495 22.89 99.38 
Total Observations 23,363,904   
 
The data was obtained from DB1B and T-100 databases available from the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (BTS). The Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) is a 10% 
sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers collected by the Office of Airline Information of 
the BTS. Quarterly information on ticket prices, data related to origin and destination airports, 
passenger quantities and distance were obtained from this database. The Air Carrier Statistics 
database, also known as the T-100 data bank, which contains domestic and international airline 
  
44 
 
market and segment data, was used in calculating the market shares and Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of sampled airlines at origin airports. A major difference between the DB1B and T-
100 data is their passenger counts. DB1B data only includes passengers who originate and end 
their flights at the respective origin and destination airports, while the T-100 data includes 
passengers from connecting flights at the respective origin and destination airports. I used the 
total number of passengers in a specific origin airport, which includes the connecting passengers 
in calculating the market share and the HHI.  
 Information on airline bankruptcy dates and status was taken from the UCLA-LoPucki 
Bankruptcy Research Database. The ratio of accommodation earnings to total non-farm earnings 
for the origin and destination airports were calculated using metropolitan level data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Data from the MIT Global Airline Industry Program was 
used in selecting a suitable instrumental variable which will be discussed later. Table 3.2 gives a 
description of the variables used in my study.  
Table 3.2. Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description  Source  
Ln_airfare 
 
 
  
Calculated by dividing the ticket price by 
the market miles flown (e.g.: if a customer 
pays $98.00 for the 500-mile segment 
above, the yield would be 19.6 cents per 
mile). 
 
DB1B Database 
Bankruptcy Dummy variable. Bankruptcy = 1 if an 
airline is under Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection, and Bankruptcy =0 otherwise. 
 
UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy 
Research Database 
Labor 
productivity 
Log of total average seat miles produced 
per dollar of employee compensation. 
 
MIT Global Airline Industry 
Program 
Ln_passengers  Log of number of passengers. 
 
DB1B Database 
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Table 3.2. Variable Descriptions (continued) 
Variable Description Source 
Ln_mktdistance Log of nonstop distance in miles between 
endpoint airports of route j. 
 
DB1B Database 
Ln_mktdissq Square of Ln_mktdistance. 
 
DB1B Database 
Ln_mktshare Share of total passengers originating from 
route j operated by carrier i in for each 
quarter of the year. 
 
T-100 
Ln_HHI Log sum of squares of each firm’s market 
share based on the origin airport. 
 
T-100 
Hub Dummy variable indicating whether either 
the origin or destination of route j is a hub 
airport of carrier i. 
 
U.S.D.O.T Air Traffic Hubs 
2012 
Touristdest The ratio of total accommodation earnings 
to total non-farm earnings in the 
metropolitan area of the destination 
airports. 
 
 BEA 
Touristori The ratio of total accommodation earnings 
to total non-farm earnings in the 
metropolitan area of the origin airports. 
 
 BEA 
  
In Borenstein and Rose (1995), only legacy airlines were used to identify the relationship 
between bankruptcy and pricing behavior. I included all the major carriers such as network 
carriers, LCCs and regional carriers in my sample to avoid bias and to make it easier to draw 
generalizations to the industry as a whole. Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics which 
describe the basic features of the data in the study.  
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Table 3.3. Summary Statistics (n = 23,363,904) 
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln_airfare  -1.987 -1.032 -9.202 4.255 
Bankruptcy  0.081 0.273 0 1 
Ln_passengers 0.345 0.734 0 8.314 
Ln_mktdistance  7.008 0.642 2.398 9.215 
Ln_mktdissq  49.524 8.779 5.750 84.909 
Ln_mktshare  -1.329 1.292 -12.353 0.000 
Ln_HHI  7.331 2.313 -6.782 10.479 
Hub  0.517 0.500 0 1 
Touristori  0.012 0.028 0.001 0.266 
Touristdest  0.012 0.027 0.001 0.266 
American Airlines 0.129 0.335 0 1 
Jet Blue Airlines 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Continental Airlines 0.088 0.283 0 1 
Delta Air Lines 0.259 0.438 0 1 
Frontier Airlines 0.011 0.106 0 1 
Hawaiian Airlines 0.002 0.050 0 1 
America West Airlines 0.018 0.132 0 1 
Northwest Airlines 0.117 0.321 0 1 
United Airlines 0.073 0.260 0 1 
US Airways 0.067 0.251 0 1 
Southwest Airlines 0.209 0.406 0 1 
Labor productivity 
 
3.283 
 
0.182 
 
2.878 
 
3.936 
 
 
 A total of more than 24 million observations was used in our research. Individual level 
airfare data obtained from DB1B were matched with the data from T-100, the BEA and the MIT 
Global Airline Industry Program in order to create the final sample data for my research.  
 Figures 3.1-3.6 display the annual average airfares of each bankrupt airlines from 2001 to 
2012. These airfares were obtained from the MIT Global Airline Industry Program. In Figure 
3.1, one can clearly see that the average airfare of US Airways was lower at the time of the 
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airline’s Chapter 11 bankruptcies. When the firm emerged from its bankruptcy protection in 
2005, a drastic increase of airfare was observed.  
In Figures 3.2 and 3.3, Hawaiian and United Airlines also appeared to have lowered 
average airfares when the firms were in bankruptcy; their airfares rose gradually as they emerged 
from bankruptcy protection. The average airfares of American, Northwest and Delta Air Lines 
seemed to be rise very slowly during and post-bankruptcy. It has become difficult to predict how 
airlines would control their airfares when facing bankruptcy without properly controlling for 
other market factors.  
 
Figure 3.1. US Airways Airfares 
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Figure 3.2. Hawaiian Airlines Airfares 
 
 
Figure 3.3. United Airlines Airfares 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2
C
EN
TS
 P
ER
 R
P
M
YEARS
UNITED AIRLINES AIRFARES
2002 Q2- 2005 Q4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2
C
E
N
T
S
 P
E
R
 R
P
M
YEARS
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES AIRFARES
2003 Q2- 2005 Q3
  
49 
 
 
  
Figure 3.4. Northwest Airlines Airfares 
 
Figure 3.5. American Airlines Airfares 
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Figure 3.6. Delta Air Lines Airfares 
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4. EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The objective of my study is to determine the effect of bankruptcy on airfares in the U.S. 
domestic airline industry. Eleven major airlines including legacy carriers, network carriers and 
LCCs have been included in the sample. I considered seven major bankruptcy filings of six U.S. 
airlines to determine how the airfares changed in times of bankruptcy filings.  
Since Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization and restructuring allows the bankrupt firms 
to negotiate contracts and reduce costs, which in turn enables the firms to lower their output 
prices (Barla and Koo, 1999; Hofer et al, 2005).  Assuming cost-minimizing behavior, the cost 
function of a carrier can be given by C(w, r, y | bankruptcy), where p is the output price, y is the 
output produced, C is cost which is a function of input prices (w and r) and output given by the 
bankruptcy status of a firm.  Thus, for carrier i, Ci(w, r, y | bankruptcy = 1) < Ci(w, r, y | 
bankruptcy = 0).  If the product market is competitive or has a very large price elasticity of 
demand, the ability to lower marginal cost of production will give firms a competitive edge over 
their rivals.  
I developed a hedonic price model to identify the determinants of airfares.  The hedonic 
price model enables me to describe the equilibrium relationships between airfares and 
characteristics of airlines and services (Nesheim, 2008). A hedonic pricing model is a useful tool 
for exploring product differentiation and price discrimination in the deregulated U.S. airline 
industry (Schwieterman, 1995). In light of the potential effect of bankruptcy on airfares, 
The hedonic price model is given below: 
Ln_(𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑘 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑞 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑞
4
𝑞=2 +
𝜏 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀.     (1)             
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In equation (1), Ln_(airfare) is a function of airline i’s bankruptcy status, a vector of 
route and market characteristics (𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑘), an annual trend as well as quarterly dummies. The route 
and market characteristic variables include the number of passengers, market distance between 
two endpoints, the square of market distance, market share of each individual airline at the origin 
airport, HHI of each origin airport, origin or destination airport being a hub for an airline, and the 
ratio of total accommodation earnings to total non-farm earnings in the metropolitan area of the 
origin and destination airports. The model in (1) also controls for carrier-specific effects. 
The dependent variable in model (1) is Ln_(𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒) which is the logarithm of market 
fare divided by the market miles flown. It covers coach-class tickets offered by carriers in the 
U.S. domestic markets, but does not include passengers flying on free tickets (such as employees 
or frequent flier program awards).  
An airline i’s bankruptcy status is the major component I considered in this research. Out 
of the eleven airlines in the selected sample, there were seven Chapter 11 bankruptcies filed by 
six airlines between the years 2001 and 2012. These include: 
Table 4.1. Major Airline Bankruptcies, 2001-2012 
Bankrupt Airlines Year and quarter of 
Bankruptcy  
Year and quarter emerged 
from Bankruptcy 
US Airways  2002 Q2 2003 Q2 
US Airways 2004 Q2 2005 Q4 
United Airlines 2002 Q2 2005 Q4 
Hawaiian Airlines 2003 Q2 2005 Q3 
Delta Air Lines 2005 Q2 2007Q3 
Northwest Airlines 2005 Q2 2007Q3 
American Airlines 2011Q3 2013 Q4 
Source: UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database 
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Borenstein (1994) concludes that increasing passenger volumes lead to higher load 
factors so the per-passenger cost of flight declines, thus lowering airfares. Thus, the number of 
passengers is expected to have a negative effect on airfares (Zhang et al., 2013).  
The average market distance for a flight from its origin to destination airports is expected 
to have a positive and significant relationship with average airfares. Generally, passengers that 
fly longer distances pay higher airfares (Wittman and Swelbar, 2013). According to Wittman and 
Swelbar (2013), this relationship has remained essentially unchanged over the past decade. As 
distance increases, average fares can be expected to rise since carriers’ operating costs including 
fuel, in-flight service and labor wages will increase (Borenstein, 1990; Dresner et al., 1996). 
Both market distance and market distance squared were used in my study specifically to allow 
the effect of distance to vary with the distance travelled. The expected sign for market distance is 
positive.  
Market share and HHI are market characteristics variables in this study. Market share is 
introduced to see the effect of airline market power on airfares, and HHI controls for the effect of 
market concentration on airfares. Since Graham et al., (1983) suggest using the number of flights 
or the number of passengers as a basis for market concentration calculations, DB1B and T-100 
data on the number of passengers travelled are used to calculate the market share which gives an 
airline’s market power and HHI. The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual 
market shares of all the airlines at the origin airports. Borenstein (1990) finds a statistically 
significant effect of market share on airfare, although Evans and Kessides (1993) conclude that 
airfares are not correlated with market share.  
Borenstein (1990) shows that while hub-and-spoke is an efficient operating system for 
airlines in terms of the number of different markets the airlines can serve, it becomes detrimental 
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for consumers because airlines are shielded from competition when they have a monopoly at 
their hub airports. His research concludes that when an airline has a dominant position in an 
airport (generally at a hub), that airline will charge higher fares than the rest of its system.  
Biegera and Wittmer (2006) suggest that developments in tourism, especially new forms 
of tourism and new destinations, also affect air transport by influencing demand. To analyze the 
impact of tourism on airfares, I include tourism at origin and destination airports as possible 
airfare determinants. Additionally, quarterly dummies are introduced to control for seasonal 
airfare fluctuations relative to the first quarter. Model (1) also controls for carrier specific effects.  
4.1. The Issue of Endogeneity  
Equation (1) assumes that an airline’s bankruptcy status affects its airfares. While the 
specification in (1) is straight forward and can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), it 
suffers from the potential problem of endogeneity given that the causal relationship between 
airfares and bankruptcy could be reversed, meaning low airfares could also be a causal factor of 
bankruptcy. 
If equation (1) suffers from the endogeneity problem due to the reversed causality effect 
of bankruptcy and airfares; it violates the zero conditional mean condition for OLS estimator to 
be valid. When the zero conditional mean condition is violated, the OLS is no longer the best 
linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). When one or more of the explanatory variables is correlated 
with the error term 𝜀, have both E (𝜀 |xi) ≠ 0 and E (xi 𝜀) ≠ 0, so the OLS estimator will be biased 
and inconsistent  (Wooldridge, 2009). 
 To address the potential problem of endogeneity, I instrument for bankruptcy. The 
selected instrument should satisfy two requirements. The first is the “instrument exogeneity” 
criterion which requires the selected instrument to have no partial effect on airfares Borenstein 
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(1994) concludes that increasing passenger volumes lead to higher load factors so the per-
passenger cost of flight declines, thus lowering airfares. 
The second requirement is “instrument relevance,” which means that the instrument must 
be correlated, either positively or negatively, with the endogenous explanatory variable, 
bankruptcy (Wooldridge, 2009). Many factors can be considered as potential instruments for 
bankruptcy which must satisfy both instrument relevance and instrument exogeneity. Bellovary 
et al. (2007) lay out a list of bankruptcy predicting variables through his study. The variables I 
select include Z-scores, cash flows and labor productivity. 
Finally as a robustness check, I break down the sample by airline and regress the airfares 
of each bankrupt airline on the market and route characteristics. This allows me to observe the 
effect of bankruptcy by airline, since such effect may not be constant for all bankrupt airlines. 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 This chapter provides the results from the econometric model in Chapter 4. I estimated 
the bankruptcy effect on airfares using the sample of air tickets of eleven major airlines and six 
bankruptcy filings between the years 2001 and 2012. Table 5.1 reports the estimates of the 
regression model specified in equation (1). The first column reports the coefficients from the 
OLS estimation, and column two reports the results of the 2SLS estimation.  
For the OLS model, I obtained a negative and significant coefficient on bankruptcy which 
indicates that airfares are approximately 4% lower for airlines under Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. The negative effect of bankruptcy on airfares could indicate a strategic pricing 
decision by the bankrupt airlines. Barla and Koo (1999) suggest that a bankrupt airline is able to 
lower its operating costs and that these cost reductions are partially translated into lower airfares. 
The result also agrees with the finding by Hofer et al. (2005) which shows that after the 
declaration of bankruptcy, airfares were lower by 5.3% than fares charged prior to the filing of 
bankruptcy protection. Nevertheless, the result contradicts Borenstein and Rose’s finding (1995) 
in which they conclude that bankrupt airlines have only lowered their airfares modestly before 
entering Chapter 11, with an average decline of about 5.5%, but they do not lower airfares in the 
bankruptcy phase.  
The coefficient estimate on the number of passengers travelled is negative as expected. 
This is consistent with the conclusions of Zhang et al., (2013) which indicate that increasing 
passenger volumes lead to higher load factors by which the per-passenger cost of the flight 
declines, thus lowering the airfares (Borenstein and Rose, 1995). 
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Market distance has a significant coefficient with the expected positive sign suggesting 
that longer flight distance leads to higher airfares. This may be due to increase in operating costs 
including fuel, in-flight service and labor wages (Borenstein, 1989; Dresner et al., 1996). 
 Market share at origin airports shows airport dominance by a carrier (Evans and 
Kessides, 1993). They find that increase of an airline’s market power (market share) has a 
positive significant effect on its airfares. The result in Table 5.1 agrees with those of  Evans and 
Kessides (1993) and Borenstein (1990). I calculated the market share based on airport level data 
following Evans and Kessides (1993). Borenstein (1990) finds that route market share are a 
better predictor of ticket price than airport market share. 
 Market concentration is expected to positively affect airfares (Borenstein, 1992, Morrison 
and Winston, 1990). However the coefficient on Ln_HHI in Table 5.1 shows that the lower the 
market concentration at an origin airport (an increase in carrier’s HHI), the lower the airfares will 
be. This is consistant with an earlier finding by Stavins (2001); she studied the effects of market 
concentraton and found a similar result. 
 The hub-and-spoke system became the norm for most major airlines after the U.S. 
government deregulated the airlines in 1978. It was used to reduce carrier’s operating cost and 
give passengers better routes to destinations (GAO, 2014). Past research shows how hub 
dominance by one or two carriers leads to higher fares (Borenstein, 1990). The significant 
positive coefficient predicts that a hub airport tends to have higher airfares (by approximately 
5%).   
 The European Travel Commission (ETC) in its 2005 report recognized airfares as the 
main drivers of growth in travel and tourism demand for countries and states (ETC, 2005). From 
the results obtained in my research, both the Touristori and Touristdest variables have negative 
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significant coefficients which suggest that if an airline is flying into or from a tourist destination, 
it tends to charge lower airfares. Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) produce similar results confirming 
that airfares are negatively correlated with tourist destinations.  
 According to the U.S.D.O.T. (2006), LCCs have been able to offer much lower fares that 
they have created new markets that network carriers could never capture. Jet Blue Airlines, 
Frontier Airlines and Southwest Airlines are the LCCs’ in my sample. These LCCs’ have a 
negative significant coefficiant in the regression results. Of the three LCC’s, Southwest Airlines 
is considered the largest LCC in the U.S. Its airfares are approximately 32.6% lower than 
American Airlines’, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that when compared to legacy carriers, 
the LCCs have been able to maintain comparatively lower airfares throughout the years of 2001-  
2012. 
 
Table 5.1. Regression Results ( Dependent variable: Ln_(airfare)) 
 (i) (ii) 
 OLS 2SLS 
Intercept  -13.159*** -12.913*** 
 (0.116) (0.120) 
Bankruptcy -0.040*** -0.042*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
Ln_passengers -0.103*** -0.103*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln_mktdistance 0.346*** 0.348*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln_mktdissq -0.082*** -0.082*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln_mktshare 0.038*** 0.039*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln_HHI -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Hub 0.051*** 0.052*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Touristdest -0.448*** -0.447*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
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Table 5.1. Regression Results ( Dependent variable: Ln_(airfare)) (continued) 
 (i) (ii) 
Touristori -0.103*** -0.100*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Jet Blue Airlines -0.119*** -0.119*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Continental Airlines 0.180*** 0.182*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Delta Air Lines -0.164*** -0.163*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Frontier Airlines -0.045*** -0.043*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Hawaiian Airlines 0.402*** 0.403*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
America West Airlines -0.132*** -0.140*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Northwest Airlines -0.055*** -0.053*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
United Airlines -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
US Airways -0.122*** -0.120*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Southwest Airlines -0.326*** -0.325*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Year 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
2.quarter -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
3.quarter -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
4.quarter -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
N 23363904 23363904 
R-Squared 0.234 0.234 
F( 23, 23,363,880) .  
Prob > F  0.0000  
Wald chi2(23)    6.20E+06 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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 The Breusch-Pagan test was carried out according to Wooldridge (2009) to see if the 
model had heteroskedasticity. Results suggested that the model did not satisfy the 
homoskedasticity condition. Since the estimators of the variances are biased without 
homoskedasticity, the OLS standard errors, which are based directly on these variances, were no 
longer valid for constructing confidence intervals and t statistics. Robust standard erors were 
used to address this issue of heteroskedasticity. 
There were potential endogeneity concerns associated with the bankruptcy variable in 
equation (1), since lower airfares might lead to bankruptcy filings of firms. If endogeneity 
prevailed in the model, the OLS result would be invalid because the error term and the 
explanatory variables become correlated, resulting OLS estimates being biased and inconsistent. 
As a solution to the potential endogeneity problem, a number of instrumental variables (IV) were 
considered. 
Following Wooldridge (2009), I tried to identify an instrumental variable (IV) which 
would satisfy the two conditions of instrument exogeneity and instrument relevance. The 
instruments first considered included the Z-scores, airline’s cash flows, financial ratios and labor 
productivity measures. Bellovary et al. (2007) review bankruptcy prediction studies in which 
they suggest that one of the best bankruptcy prediction models was Altmans’ Z-score (1968). 
Although the Z-score showed instrument relavance in my study, it failed the instrument 
exogeneity criterion. 
Another bankruptcy prediction variable according to Bellovary et al. (2007) was cash 
flows. Data obtained from the MIT Global Airline Industry Program was used for this. Net cash 
provided by (used in) operating activities, net cash provided by (used in) operating activities, net 
cash provided by (used in) investing activities, net cash provided by (used in) financing activities 
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and net increase (decrease) in cash were some of the cash flow variables considered as potential 
IVs’ for bankruptcy. They too failed the instrument exogeneity requirement. 
 According to Beaver (1966), net income to total debt had the highest predictive ability of 
bankruptcy. I used financial ratios such as working capital (current assets - current liabilities), 
external financing index ratio (cash flow from financing/cash flow from operations) and current 
ratio or liquidity ratio (current assets/current liabilities) as well as net income and pre-tax income 
as potential IVs. All of these factors are instrument relevant but fail to be instrument exogenous. 
 Finally, I consider labor productivity as a potential IV.  It is measured by total available 
seat miles (ASMs) produced per dollar of employee compensation. This variable satisfies both 
instrument exogeneity and instrument relevance and is therefore a valid IV for bankruptcy. Table 
5.2 displays the instrument relavance of the IV selected for the bankruptcy variable.  
In the table, labor productivity has a significant coefficient when included in the 
regression for equation (1). Bryan et al. (2013) find that higher productivity leads to lower 
bankruptcy risk. However, when airlines undergo Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization and 
restructuring, they have the ability to renegotiate labor contracts and reduce employee 
compensation (Barla and Koo, 1999; Ciliberto and Schenone, 2012). Holloway (2008) observes 
that output produced by bankrupt carriers does not seem to decrease. He views Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection as an “exit barrier” in the industry that deters new entrants. He finds that 
in 2005, nearly half of the ASMs in the U.S. domestic markets were produced by carriers in or 
recently out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Thus, if carriers’ ASMs remain stable while employee compensation drops, the labor 
productivity measure is expected to be larger for bankrupt airlines. As a result, the coefficient on 
labor productivity could have a positive sign. This means that while higher productivity lowers 
  
62 
 
the risk of bankruptcy, ASMs per dollar of employee compensation could be positively 
associated with bankruptcy status because of cost restructuring. 
Table 5.2. Instrument Relevance 
Stage 1 Regression (Dependent Variable: Bankruptcy)  
 (i) 
Intercept 20.081 
 (0.023) 
Ln_passengers  -0.005*** 
 (0.000) 
Ln_mktdistance  -0.008*** 
 (0.001) 
Ln_mktdissq  0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
Ln_mktshare  0.005*** 
 (0.000) 
Ln_HHI  0.007*** 
 (0.000) 
Hub  -0.014*** 
 0.000 
Touristdest  -0.101*** 
 (0.002) 
Touristori  -0.081*** 
 (0.002) 
Labor productivity 0.701*** 
 (0.001) 
N 23,363,904 
R-squared  0.2129 
F 134,082.11 
Prob > F 0 
+Year, quarterly dummies and airline dummy variables considered but not reported here  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In Table 5.3, instrument exogeneity is evident by labor productivity variable becoming 
insignificant when included in equation (1).  
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Table 5.3. Instrument Exogeneity 
Instrument Exogeneity (Dependent Variable: Ln_(airfare)) 
 (i) 
 ln_airfare 
Intercept -12.952*** 
  (0.119) 
Bankruptcy -0.040*** 
 (0.001) 
Labor Productivity  -0.001 
 (0.002) 
Ln_passengers -0.103*** 
 (0.000) 
Ln_mktdistance 0.348*** 
 (0.006) 
Ln_mktdissq -0.082*** 
 (0.000) 
Ln_mktshare 0.039*** 
 (0.000) 
Ln_HHI -0.004*** 
 (0.000) 
Hub 0.052*** 
 (0.000) 
Touristdest -0.446*** 
 (0.007) 
Touristori -0.100*** 
 (0.007) 
N 23363904 
R-squared 0.234 
F(24,23363879) . 
Prob > F 0 
+Year, quarterly dummies and airline dummy variables considered but not reported here 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
 
According to Wooldridge (2009), when having a valid instrumental variable, I can test 
whether an explanatory variable is endogenous. The 2SLS estimator is less efficient than OLS 
when the explanatory variables are exogenous; and the 2SLS estimates can have very large 
standard errors. Therefore, it is useful to have a test for endogeneity of an explanatory variable 
(bankruptcy) that shows whether 2SLS is even necessary. 
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I applied the endogeneity test suggested by Wooldridge (2009). First, I estimated the 
reduced form equation of  bankruptcy by regressing it on all exogenous variables including the 
IV, labor productivity. The  residuals, ?̂? was obtained. Secondly ?̂? was included to the structural 
equation (which also includes bankruptcy) and test for the significance of  ?̂?  using an OLS 
regression with robust standard errors. If the coefficient on ?̂? is statistically different from zero, I 
can conclude that bankruptcy is indeed endogenous. The results obtained from the endogeneity 
test is given by Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Tests of Endogeneity 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
 
Robust score chi2(1)            =  .644  (p = 0.422) 
Robust regression F(1,23363879) =  .644  (p = 0.422) 
 
According to Table 5.4, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis that bankruptcy is 
exogenous at conventional significance levels (p = 0.422). Hence, I conclude that there is 
insufficient evidence of endogeneity in the model, and the OLS results are valid. 
Finally as a robustness check, I estimate the same equation by bankrupt airlines between 
2001 and 2012. Out of the six airlines which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, only 
Northwest Airlines seemed to have increased its airfares by approximately 4% after going 
bankrupt. The rest of the airlines have reduced their airfares at the time of bankruptcy filing. 
United Airlines and Hawaiian Airlines have reduced their airfares by approximately 16.4 % and 
18.9% respectively after filing for Chapter 11. The bankruptcy variable for all airlines, except for 
Delta Air Lines, are significant at the 1% significance level. Table 5.5 displays the results of the 
bankrupt airlines regressions.  
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Table 5.5. OLS Outputs of Bankrupt Airlines 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
 
US 
Airways 
United 
Airlines  
Delta Air 
Lines 
American 
Airlines 
Northwest 
Airlines 
Hawaiian 
Airlines 
 Ln_airfare Ln_airfare Ln_airfare Ln_airfare Ln_airfare Ln_airfare 
Intercept  -19.13*** -0.546 6.130*** -6.610*** -15.36*** -10.09** 
  (0.452) (0.573) (0.232) (0.114) (0.535) (3.398) 
Bankruptcy -0.0696*** -0.164*** 0.00120 -0.0413*** 0.0426*** -0.189*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012) 
Ln_passengers -0.101*** -0.118*** -0.0914*** -0.101*** -0.121*** -0.291*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) 
Ln_mktdistanc
e -1.326*** -0.148*** 0.621*** 0.190*** -0.721*** 0.0840 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.011) (0.006) (0.018) (0.471) 
Ln_mktdissq 0.0365*** -0.0390*** -0.0995*** -0.0686*** -0.0184*** -0.0495 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.035) 
Ln_mktshare 0.0086*** 0.0419*** 0.0218*** 0.00997*** 0.0435*** 0.0373*** 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Ln_HHI 0.0122*** 0.0455*** -0.00678*** -0.0118*** -0.00587*** 0.00448 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Hub 0.109*** -0.0171*** 0.134*** 0.0525*** 0.00339** 0.0312*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) 
Touristdest -0.968*** -1.227*** -1.312*** -0.494*** -0.570*** 0.315* 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.017) (0.007) (0.024) (0.134) 
Touristori -0.577*** -0.718*** -0.548*** -0.279*** 0.0610* -0.212 
 (0.031) (0.024) (0.016) (0.006) (0.024) (0.123) 
Year 0.0122*** 0.000677* -0.00374*** 0.00340*** 0.00974*** 0.00517*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
2.quarter 0.0315*** 0.165*** -0.0420*** 0.0159*** -0.00234 0.0379*** 
 (0.312) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0) 
3.quarter 0.0382*** 0.0855*** -0.0426*** -0.0329*** 0.0180*** 0.0136 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) 
4.quarter -0.0825*** 0.0141*** -0.0765*** 0.000463 0.0226*** 0.0530*** 
 (0.082) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) 
N 1,521,028 1,607,464 6,122,388 2,391,345 2,787,085 63,313 
R-squared 0.302 0.214 0.217 0.218 0.289 0.090 
F 41,105.96 30,783.00 . . 83,866.62 256.41 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses & "* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001" 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, a cross sectional analysis was performed to examine the effect of Chapter 
11 bankruptcy restructuring on airfares in the U.S. domestic airline industry. Using data on 
domestic, direct, coach-class airfares from DB1B and T-100 databases, I develop a hedonic 
pricing model to study the relationship between airfares and bankruptcy. The model was 
estimated using the OLS and 2SLS methods. Endogeneity test confirmed that the model was 
exogenous thus making the OLS results valid. Finally as a robustness check, I broke down the 
sample by airline and regressed the airfare of each bankrupt airline on the market and route 
characteristics.  
The main result of the hedonic price model is that, airfares charged by a bankrupt airline 
are approximately 4% lower than airfares of other airlines that are not in bankruptcy, ceteris 
paribus, although larger fare reductions were observed when examining individual bankrupt 
airlines. For example, my results show that US Airways and Hawaiian Airlines reduced their 
airfares by approximately 16 percent and 19 percent respectively during bankruptcy. However 
Northwest Airline is the only exception with an increased airfare at the time of bankruptcy. The 
strong negative correlation of bankruptcy and airfares suggests the possibility that airlines might 
have taken advantage of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection as a strategy to slash airfares or to 
undercut rivals’ prices.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that the LCCs included in our sample have lower 
airfares when compared to the legacy airlines. For example Southwest Airlines, which is 
considered as a major LCC in the U.S., had approximately 33% lower airfares when compared to 
the legacy carrier, American Airlines. This suggests a high degree of price competition in the 
industry. 
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Also, it is evident that airlines will charge higher airfares at their hub airports compared 
to their non-hub airports. Airlines flying to a tourist destination tend to have approximately 44% 
lower airfares while airlines flying from a tourist destination will have approximately 10% lower 
airfares.  
Borenstein and Rose (1995) used only four legacy airlines for their study. Using more 
data, I have included 11 airlines representing legacy carriers, network carriers and LCCs. When 
compared to Barla and Koo (1999) who only used data for the second quarter of each year to 
analyze the effect of bankruptcy on pricing strategies, I have extended this by including all the 
four quarters of the year.  
A major shortcoming in this study is that I was not able to find a suitable IV at the 
individual airline level that satisfies both instrument relevance and instrument exogeneity.  
Airfares prior to the filing of bankruptcy and airfare fluctuations post carrier’s bankruptcy were 
not considered in this research. Also, rival’s pricing strategies in response to an airline’s 
bankruptcy were not considered in this study. 
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